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THE SEC’S FORGOTTEN POWER OF EXEMPTION: HOW
THE SEC CAN RECEIVE DEFERENCE IN FAVOR OF
INTERNAL WHISTLEBLOWERS EVEN WHEN THE
TEXT IS CLEAR
ABSTRACT
In 2008, the United States suffered its worst financial crisis since the Great
Depression. This crisis was precipitated by corporate fraud committed by some
of the largest Wall Street firms. Congress responded by passing the DoddFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank)
to improve accountability and transparency in the financial system.
Recognizing the importance of whistleblowers in exposing corporate fraud,
Congress included an anti-retaliation provision in Dodd-Frank, which was
designed to protect whistleblowers from retaliation after coming forward with
evidence of corporate wrongdoings.
However, until recently, it was unclear who qualified as a whistleblower
under this provision. On the one hand, the statute expressly defines
“whistleblower” as an individual who discloses corporate wrongdoing
externally to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and the antiretaliation provision prohibits employers from retaliating against a
“whistleblower” who engaged in various protected activities. On the other
hand, the anti-retaliation provision lists three categories of protected
activities, one of which does not require disclosure to the SEC. The SEC
attempted to clarify the scope of anti-retaliation protection by creating a rule
that included internal whistleblowers as “whistleblowers” for anti-retaliation
purposes, regardless of whether they satisfied the requirement of reporting “to
the Commission.” Rather than resolving the issue, the SEC’s rule introduced a
new and related question: Should a court defer to the SEC’s rule under the
two-step framework established by the U.S. Supreme Court in Chevron, U.S.A.
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.? This issue created a circuit
split, primarily derived from divergent court interpretations of the antiretaliation provision’s text. Recently, in Digital Realty Trust, Inc. v. Somers,
the Supreme Court resolved this split by applying Chevron and holding that
one must disclose to the SEC to qualify as a “whistleblower” under DoddFrank. The Supreme Court reasoned that Dodd-Frank explicitly defined
“whistleblower” as requiring disclosure to the SEC, leaving no room to defer
to the SEC’s interpretation.
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The Supreme Court, however, left open the question of whether the SEC
could nevertheless relieve internal whistleblowers from this requirement
through the SEC’s general exemptive authority, a power explicitly granted by
Congress that allows the SEC to broadly exempt any person or class from
Dodd-Frank requirements. This Comment surveys existing case law to
highlight how the SEC may still extend Dodd-Frank anti-retaliation protection
to internal whistleblowers while conforming to Chevron and the recent
Supreme Court ruling. The SEC can accomplish this by exempting internal
whistleblowers from disclosing to the SEC. Ultimately, this Comment argues
that the SEC can advance Dodd-Frank’s goals of expanding whistleblower
protections by exercising its forgotten general exemptive authority to protect
internal whistleblowers, even if Dodd-Frank’s text clearly requires disclosure
to the SEC.
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INTRODUCTION
The financial crisis of 2008 was estimated to have cost Americans more
than $12.8 trillion, including the jobs of 23.1 million Americans and the
destruction of household net worth.1 This crisis was escalated in part by
corporate fraud committed by a string of Wall Street firms,2 some of which
were exposed by persistent whistleblowers.3
In response to the financial crisis, Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act4 (Dodd-Frank) in 2010 “[t]o
promote . . . financial stability by . . . improving accountability and
transparency in the financial system.”5 Section 21F of Dodd-Frank, entitled
“Securities whistleblower incentives and protection,” was drafted with the goal
of strengthening the corporate-whistleblower incentives and protections of
existing legislation, particularly those of the Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act of
2002.6 To encourage whistleblowers to report securities laws violations, DoddFrank established a whistleblower awards program, which provides large
monetary incentives to those who report securities violations under specified
conditions.7 The Act also consists of an anti-retaliation section, which prohibits
employers from retaliating against whistleblowers who report securities laws
violations.8
However, until recently, it was unclear who qualified as a whistleblower
for Dodd-Frank anti-retaliation protection. For instance, when an employee
discovers corporate fraud, she typically faces two reporting routes. She could
choose to first report internally by alerting a supervisor or “higher-up” within

1
See DENNIS KELLEHER ET AL., BETTER MARKETS, THE COST OF THE WALL-STREET CAUSED
FINANCIAL COLLAPSE AND ONGOING ECONOMIC CRISIS IS MORE THAN $12.8 TRILLION 1 (2012).
2
SEC Enforcement Actions: Addressing Misconduct That Led to or Arose from the Financial Crisis,
U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/enf-actions-fc.shtml (last modified Feb.
22, 2017) (detailing the 204 individuals and entities charged with misconduct that led to or arose from the
2008 financial crisis).
3
See Rick Rothacker, Bank of America Whistleblower Receives $14.5 Million in Mortgage Case,
REUTERS, May 29, 2012, 7:28 PM, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-bankofamerica-whistleblower-idUSBRE
84S1GP20120529.
4
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376
(2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.).
5
Id.
6
15 U.S.C. § 78u-6 (2012) (codifying Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
§ 21F); Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 1107, 116 Stat. 745, 810 (codified in scattered
sections of U.S.C.).
7
15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(b) (awarding up to 30% of monetary sanctions imposed in a successful action to
which a whistleblower contributes significant information).
8
Id. § 78u-6(h)(1)(a)(i)–(iii).
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the company.9 Alternatively, she could first report externally, to someone
outside of the company, such as a government regulatory agency.10 While one
might think that an employee should be protected from retaliation under DoddFrank regardless of which route she takes, some courts have limited protection
to only those who report externally.11
In Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C.,12 the Fifth Circuit did not extend
Dodd-Frank protection to a whistleblower who was fired after reporting
securities violations to his supervisor instead of to the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), and in doing so, declined to defer to the SEC’s rule,13
which extends protection to internal whistleblowers.14 The Sixth Circuit in
Verble v. Morgan Stanley Smith Barney, LLC also declined to defer to the
SEC’s rule, but dodged the issue of the scope of protection by dismissing the
case on procedural grounds (insufficient pleading).15 However, the Second
Circuit’s recent decision in Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC16 created a circuit
split by deferring to the SEC’s rule.17 On February 21, 2018, the Supreme
Court ultimately resolved the split and declined to defer to the SEC’s rule,
holding that Dodd-Frank’s text explicitly required a whistleblower to report to
the SEC to qualify for anti-retaliation protection, leaving no room for the
SEC’s interpretation.18 The Supreme Court did not discuss whether the SEC
may nevertheless exempt internal whistleblowers from this requirement of
reporting to the SEC because this precise issue was never raised by the parties
or discussed in any case law on Dodd-Frank’s anti-retaliation provision.19 This
would be an appropriate way for the SEC to still provide internal
9
Frank J. Cavico, Private Sector Whistleblowing and the Employment-At-Will Doctrine: A
Comparative Legal, Ethical, and Pragmatic Analysis, 45 S. TEX. L. REV. 543, 548 (2004).
10
Id. This Comment will refer to any reports made to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
as “external whistleblowing,” and any other reports, including those made to higher-ups within the company or
to law enforcement, as “internal whistleblowing.”
11
See, e.g., Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620, 621, 630 (5th Cir. 2013).
12
Id.
13
This rule will be discussed in detail in section I.C. See infra notes 63–68 and accompanying text.
14
Asadi, 720 F.3d at 621–30. This Comment will refer to this decision as the “Asadi approach.”
15
676 Fed. App’x 421, 425–26 (6th Cir. 2017). The whistleblower in Verble was the first to petition the
Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari to clarify whether Dodd-Frank should protect internal whistleblowers,
but the Supreme Court declined to grant certiorari. Verble v. Morgan Stanley Smith Barney, LLC, 137 S. Ct.
1348 (2017) (mem.).
16
801 F.3d 145 (2d Cir. 2015).
17
Id. at 155. This Comment will refer to this decision as the “Berman approach.” The Berman approach
was recently followed by the Ninth Circuit in Somers v. Digital Realty Trust Inc., 850 F.3d 1045, 1050 (9th
Cir. 2017).
18
Dig. Realty Tr., Inc. v. Somers, 138 S. Ct. 767, 781–82 (2018).
19
See id.; Brief for Respondent, Somers, 138 S. Ct. 767 (No. 16-1276); Reply Brief for Petitioner,
Somers, 138 S. Ct. 767 (No. 16-1276).
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whistleblowers with Dodd-Frank anti-retaliation protection because Congress
expressly granted the SEC a broad exemptive authority that would allow the
SEC to relax Dodd-Frank whistleblower requirements for any person or class,
as long as doing so is within the public interest.20
It is important for the SEC to exercise its broad exemptive authority to
promulgate a new rule in favor of internal whistleblowers because the interests
of internal whistleblowers, corporate employers, the SEC, and shareholders are
at stake. For instance, more than half of Americans are corporate
shareholders21 and depend on individuals with special information to report
securities fraud and prevent catastrophic loss similar to that caused by the
financial crisis.22 Nevertheless, even though reports of securities violations
have both steadily risen since Congress implemented Dodd-Frank and played
tremendous roles in exposing the largest securities violations,23 retaliation rates
remain at a record high.24 If the SEC allows for a blanket requirement of
reporting to the SEC to qualify for Dodd-Frank anti-retaliation protection,
many potential internal whistleblowers would likely stay silent rather than risk
their jobs and reputations by coming forward with material information.
Accordingly, it is crucial for the SEC to promulgate a new rule that would
maximize whistleblowing while minimizing retaliation in light of the recent
Supreme Court ruling. Furthermore, corporations are affected because limiting
protection to external whistleblowers has the potential to both thwart the
internal compliance systems that employers are required to maintain under
SOX,25 and create a heavy financial burden for corporations to make internal
whistleblowing more appealing to prevent employees from going directly to

20

See infra note 71 and accompanying text.
Justin McCarthy, Little Change in Percentage of Americans Who Own Stocks, GALLUP (Apr. 22,
2015), http://www.gallup.com/poll/182816/little-change-percentage-americans-invested-market.aspx (describing the
results from a survey which found that 55% of Americans are invested in the stock market as of 2015,
compared to 62% from before the 2008 financial crisis).
22
See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
23
See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Announces Largest-Ever Whistleblower
Award (Sept. 22, 2014), http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1370543011290
(awarding $30 million to a whistleblower who provided “key original information” about an ongoing fraud).
24
See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 2015 ANNUAL REPORT ON DODD-FRANK WHISTLEBLOWER
PROGRAM 21 (2015) (charting a 30% increase in tips in the four years that Dodd-Frank had been in operation);
ETHICS RES. CTR., NATIONAL BUSINESS ETHICS SURVEY OF THE U.S. WORKFORCE 2013 26–27 (2014) (finding
that although reporting has increased steadily since 2007, retaliation has remained a record high of 21% in
2013).
25
See 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m)(4) (2012) (requiring audit committees of covered companies to establish
internal procedures for receiving complaints of questionable accounting matters and for the anonymous
submission of complaints).
21
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the SEC.26 Therefore, it is also imperative for the SEC to exercise its
exemptive authority in a way that would maximize the effectiveness of the
internal compliance systems of corporations.
This Comment argues that the SEC should promulgate a new rule pursuant
to its broad exemptive authority that would extend Dodd-Frank protection to
internal whistleblowers, a rule that would likely receive deference even though
Dodd-Frank’s text clearly requires external reporting. When agencies act
pursuant to their broad exemptive authorities, courts have entitled agencies to
Chevron deference regardless of whether the statute’s substantive provision (in
this case, the Dodd-Frank anti-retaliation provision) is clear on the issue.27
Instead, courts have focused on the language of the authority-granting
provision—which, in the case of the SEC’s general exemptive authority, is
incredibly broad—thus creating ambiguity as to whether Congress intended to
allow the SEC to exempt internal whistleblowers from the “to the
Commission” requirement for anti-retaliation protection.
This Comment proceeds in three parts. Part I discusses the historical
background behind the enactment of Dodd-Frank; Dodd-Frank’s statutory
provisions that give rise to the issue of who qualifies for Dodd-Frank antiretaliation protection; the SEC’s invalidated rule, which attempts to clarify
who qualifies for such protection; and the SEC’s general exemptive authority.
To highlight how the SEC may still protect internal whistleblowers by
promulgating a new rule pursuant to its general exemptive authority, Part II
discusses differing approaches among circuit and district courts on whether to
defer to the SEC’s rule and the Supreme Court’s rejection of the SEC’s rule
under the two-step test established by the Supreme Court in Chevron.28 Finally,
Part III argues that the SEC should exercise its broad exemptive authority to
extend Dodd-Frank anti-retaliation protection to internal whistleblowers
because doing so would allow it to receive deference from the Supreme Court
under Chevron.

26
Umang Desai, Crying Foul: Whistleblower Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, LOY. U. CHI.
L.J. 427, 456–58 (2012) (discussing how Dodd-Frank would place a significant financial burden on
corporations by pushing them to improve internal systems of corporate governance at crippling expenses);
Michael D. Wagner, SEC Reduces Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Award for “Unreasonable Delay,” Announces
Policy of “More Heavily” Punishing Delay After Award Program’s Implementation, NAT’L L. REV. (Nov. 16,
2015),
http://www.natlawreview.com/article/sec-reduces-dodd-frank-whistleblower-award-unreasonabledelay-announces-policy-more (describing concern that Dodd-Frank would “drive more whistleblowers to go
directly to the SEC first, without elevating the issue at the company, making it even more imperative that
companies have . . . reporting systems in place to address whistleblower complaints”).
27
See infra note 149 and accompanying text.
28
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1983).
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BACKGROUND OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT, THE DODD-FRANK ACT,
AND THE SEC’S REJECTED INTERPRETATION OF “WHISTLEBLOWER”

After a series of severe market collapses, Congress passed some of the
most sweeping financial legislations in response: SOX, followed by DoddFrank.29 This Part first discusses SOX and its special emphasis on reviving
investor confidence and market stability by strengthening the internal corporate
structure and expanding whistleblower protections and incentives.30 Then it
discusses Dodd-Frank’s purpose and statutory provisions to provide insight
into how the SEC can justify a new rule that provides internal whistleblowers
with Dodd-Frank anti-retaliation protection in the public interest under its
general exemptive authority.31 This Part then discusses the SEC’s definition of
“whistleblower,” which if promulgated under the SEC’s exemptive authority,
would properly address policy concerns and be consistent with the public
interest. This Part concludes by discussing how the purpose and history behind
the SEC’s general exemptive authority pave the way for the SEC to exercise
the authority in favor of internal whistleblowers.
A. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
Congress enacted SOX in response to major fraudulent corporate practices
by once-prominent firms, including Enron and WorldCom.32 These corporate
scandals led to a plummet of investor confidence in major companies and the
stock market.33 Because the scandals were attributed to a weak corporate
structure, SOX aimed to “reduce fraud by forcing corporations to submit more
reliable financial statements and to ensure that auditors could recognize
problems [earlier].”34 In drafting ways to achieve this, Senators were moved by
their outrage from learning that employees at corporations were “discouraged
[from whistleblowing] at nearly every turn” by retaliation.35 Such
discouragements, coupled with public outcry from the lack of state and federal
29
See Recent Legislation, Congress Expands Incentives for Whistleblowers to Report Suspected
Violations to the SEC, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1829, 1832 (2011).
30
Id. at 1832–34.
31
See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §78mm(a)(1) (2012) (“[T]he
Commission . . . may . . . exempt any person . . . from any provision or provisions of [Dodd-Frank] or of any
rule or regulation thereunder, to the extent that such exemption is necessary or appropriate in the public
interest, and is consistent with the protection of investors.” (emphasis added)).
32
Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114
YALE L.J. 1521, 1523 (2005).
33
Robert E. Freer Jr. & Raymond W. Burroughs, Unintended Consequences: Sarbanes-Oxley and Its
Progeny, 7 S.C. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 47, 51 (2010).
34
Desai, supra note 26, at 442.
35
See S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 4–5.
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law protections to private-sector whistleblowers,36 motivated Congress to
include expansive whistleblower protections in SOX.37
These expansive protections include an anti-retaliation section, which
extends a private cause of action to employees of publicly traded companies
who were retaliated against for reporting corporate fraud either internally or
externally.38 The section prohibits covered companies under SOX from
retaliating against “an employee” who reports corporate fraud to “(A) a Federal
regulatory or law enforcement agency; (B) any member of Congress or any
committee of Congress; or (C) a person with supervisory authority over the
employee.”39
SOX also attempted to strengthen the internal corporate structure by
requiring publicly traded companies to establish procedures for receiving
complaints and for allowing employees to submit anonymous complaints.40 As
part of this structure, auditors and corporate attorneys must first disclose
evidence of corporate fraud to the company’s internal management before
reporting to outside federal agencies.41 These requirements were implemented
as a means of “encouraging and supporting whistleblowing before any
disclosure is made.”42
SOX’s whistleblower protections have nevertheless been largely
ineffective at encouraging whistleblowers or deterring retaliation, with the
large majority of cases resolved in favor of the employer.43 First, opponents

36
Jarod S. Gonzalez, SOX, Statutory Interpretation, and the Seventh Amendment: Sarbanes-Oxley Act
Whistleblower Claims and Jury Trials, 9 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 25, 26 (2006). At the time, federal law only
protected government employees and private employees in very specific industries, and less than half of the
states had anti-retaliation laws for private-sector employees. See Richard Moberly, Sarbanes-Oxley’s
Whistleblower Provisions: Ten Years Later, 64 S.C. L. REV. 1, 3 (2012).
37
Moberly, supra note 36, at 5; Robert G. Vaughn, America’s First Comprehensive Statute Protecting
Corporate Whistleblowers, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 2 (2005).
38
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(1) (2012).
39
Id. § 1514A(a)(1).
40
Id. § 78j-1(m)(4) (“Each audit committee shall establish [such] procedures . . . .”).
41
See 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(b)(1)–(3) (2012) (requiring auditors to report likely corporate violations to
appropriate management, and to the SEC only after management fails to take remedial action); id. § 7245
(requiring an in-house attorney to report securities violations first to the chief executive officer (CEO) or
counsel, and then to the board of directors if the CEO or counsel does not take appropriate remedial measures).
42
See Moberly, supra note 36, at 10 (quoting Richard E. Moberly, Sarbanes-Oxley’s Structural Model
to Encourage Corporate Whistleblowers, 2006 BYU L. REV. 1107, 1131 (2006)).
43
See Terry Morehead Dworkin, SOX and Whistleblowing, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1757, 1764–65 (2007)
(“[O]f the 677 completed Sarbanes-Oxley complaints, 499 were dismissed and 95 were withdrawn. . . . Of the
cases that went to an administrative law judge (“ALJ”), only 6 (two percent) of the 286 resulted in a decision
for the employee.”); Alexander Dyck et al., Who Blows the Whistle on Corporate Fraud?, 65 J. FIN. 2213,
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note that SOX anti-retaliation claimants must go through procedural hurdles
before they can successfully file suit in a district court. Claimants must first
file a complaint with the Secretary of Labor (SOL), and then file suit in a
district court only if the SOL has not issued a final decision within 180 days.44
This limitation on filing suit is complicated by a very brief statute of
limitations of 180 days after the violation occurred or after the employee
became aware of the violation.45 This brief statute of limitations has led
various plaintiffs to file suit after the filing period for SOX claims has
expired.46 And even if the claimant successfully establishes liability, the
remedies are limited to reinstatement, backpay, or compensation of various
legal fees.47 Many have therefore criticized SOX for providing insufficient
incentives for whistleblowers to come forward.48
In addition, the SEC has been censured post-SOX for failing to timely
address the complaints of whistleblowers who attempted to expose what
ultimately became one of the biggest corporate scandals.49 Critics have
attributed this failure to the SEC’s lack of experience prior to Dodd-Frank in
understanding the complexities of corporate fraud and its inefficient system in
handing whistleblower complaints.50
Not surprisingly, major companies continued to engage in corporate fraud,
contributing significantly to the “worst financial crisis since the Great
Depression.”51 In response to the crisis, and while recognizing the assistance
that whistleblowers have provided, Congress passed Dodd-Frank with the goal
of expanding protections and incentives for corporate whistleblowers.52
2250 (2010) (finding that the percentage of employee whistleblowers actually dropped from 18.4% to 13.2%
after SOX was passed).
44
18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(1).
45
Id. § 1514A(b)(2)(D).
46
See, e.g., Banko v. Apple Inc., 20 F. Supp. 3d 749, 754 (N.D. Cal. 2013).
47
15 U.S.C. § 1514A(c)(2) (2012).
48
See, e.g., Lucienne M. Hartmann, Comment, Whistle While You Work: The Fairytale-Like
Whistleblower Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act and the Emergence of “Greedy,” the Eighth Dwarf, 62
MERCER L. REV. 1279, 1285 (2010) (“[T]he Sarbanes-Oxley Act did not provide any true incentives to
employees to provide information to outside authorities.”).
49
See Madoff Whistleblower: SEC Failed to Do the Math, NPR (Mar. 2, 2010, 12:00 AM),
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=124208012 [hereinafter Madoff Whistleblower].
50
See, e.g., Moberly, supra note 36, at 52 (“Before Dodd-Frank, the SEC did not have an organized and
efficient system in place to handle tips . . . .”); Madoff Whistleblower, supra note 49 (illustrating the Madoff
whistleblower’s thoughts on how “the SEC is staffed by lawyers who don’t understand the mathematically
complex financial products that are traded on the markets”).
51
Michael S. Barr, The Financial Crisis and the Path of Reform, 29 YALE J. ON REG. 91, 92 (2012).
52
See, e.g., Hartmann, supra note 48, at 1287; Samuel C. Leifer, Note, Protecting Whistleblower
Protections in the Dodd-Frank Act, 113 MICH. L. REV. 121, 131 (2014).
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B. The Dodd-Frank Act of 2010
Dodd-Frank attempted to strengthen the existing whistleblower protections
and incentives in four ways.53 First, Dodd-Frank attempted to address the
inefficiencies of the prior system at handling whistleblower tips: it granted the
SEC more authority and enforcement power by creating the SEC’s Office of
the Whistleblower, which includes attorneys and staff members who are
specialized in investigating whistleblower claims.54 Second, Dodd-Frank
removed the procedural complications of filing SOX anti-retaliation claims,
creating a new private right of action that allows whistleblowers to bring their
claims directly in a district court without first having to exhaust administrative
remedies.55 Third, Dodd-Frank significantly lengthened the statute of
limitations56 and expanded available remedies.57 Finally, Dodd-Frank created a
bounty program that awards whistleblowers large amounts under specified
conditions of the Act.58
While Dodd-Frank increased whistleblower protections and incentives in
many ways, the scope of protection it provides to whistleblowers is less clear.
Dodd-Frank protects whistleblowers as follows:
No employer may discharge, demote, suspend, threaten, harass,
directly or indirectly, or in any other manner discriminate against, a
whistleblower in the terms and conditions of employment because of
any lawful act done by the whistleblower—
(i)
in providing information to the Commission in
accordance with this section;
(ii) in initiating, testifying in, or assisting in any investigation
or judicial or administrative action of the Commission
based upon or related to such information; or
(iii) in making disclosures that are required or protected under
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 . . . and any other law,

53

See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h) (2012).
This is an important move in light of complaints prior to Dodd-Frank’s enactment regarding the
SEC’s capabilities of handling reports of securities violations. See, e.g., Moberly, supra note 36, at 52; Madoff
Whistleblower, supra note 49.
55
Compare 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h), with 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(1) (2012).
56
See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(B)(iii) (providing claimants with six years after the violation occurred or
three years after the claimant becomes aware of the violation).
57
See id. § 78u-6(h)(1)(C) (allowing for recovery of two times back pay compared to only back pay
provided under the SOX anti-retaliation section).
58
Id. § 78u-6(b) (awarding up to 30% of monetary sanctions imposed in a successful action to which a
whistleblower contributes significant information).
54
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rule, or regulation subject to the jurisdiction of the
Commission.59

Most notable and uncontroversial about this provision is that it protects
whistleblowers from retaliation if they engage in protected activities under (i)–
(iii).60 Under Dodd-Frank’s definition section, “whistleblower” is defined as
“any individual who provides . . . information relating to a violation of the
securities laws to the Commission, in a manner established, by rule or
regulation, by the Commission.”61 Therefore, should this statutory definition
be read into the anti-retaliation provision, individuals would be protected only
if they report securities laws violations externally to the SEC.62 While some
courts supported such a reading, others found that the text warrants a broader
reading, leading the SEC to promulgate a rule to clarify the scope of
protection.
C. The SEC’s Invalidated Rule
The SEC used its notice-and-comment rulemaking authority63 on August
12, 2011 to promulgate a final rule, clarifying that individuals are
whistleblowers protected under Dodd-Frank regardless of whether they report
violations internally or externally.64 Specifically, the SEC defined
“whistleblower” for purposes of the anti-retaliation section as a person who
provides information relating to possible securities laws violations “in a
manner described by [the Dodd-Frank anti-retaliation section],” which includes

59

Id. § 78u-6(h)(1)(a)(i)–(iii).
Id.
61
Id. § 78u-6(a)(6) (emphasis added).
62
Id. § 78u-6(h) (“No employer may [retaliate] against, a whistleblower . . . because of any lawful act
done by the whistleblower [in engaging in the activities listed in (i)–(iii)].” (emphasis added)).
63
Id. § 78u-6(j); see SEC Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 34,300,
34,304 (June 13, 2011) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249) [hereinafter Final Comments]. Notice-andcomment rulemaking requires the agency to publish notice of its proposed rulemaking in the Federal Register
and provide the public the opportunity to comment on the proposed rule. Administrative Procedure Act, 5
U.S.C. § 553(b) (2012). Unlike other forms of agency actions, notice-and-comment rulemaking carries the
force of law. Brian Wolfman & Bradley Girard, Argument Preview: The Administrative Procedure Act,
Notice-and-Comment Rule Making, and “Interpretive” Rules, SCOTUSBLOG (Nov. 26, 2014, 10:13 AM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/11/argument-previewthe-administrative-procedure-act-notice-and-commentrule-making-and-interpretive-rules. Agency actions that carry the force of law are entitled to Chevron
deference from courts rather than having a mere persuasive effect. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218,
226–27 (2001).
64
See 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-2(b)(1) (2013) (“For purposes of the anti-retaliation protections afforded by
[Dodd-Frank], you are a whistleblower if . . . you possess a reasonable belief that the information you are
providing relates to a possible securities law violation . . . [and] provide that information in a manner described
by [the Dodd-Frank anti-retaliation section].”).
60
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the cross-reference in subdivision (iii) to protected activity under SOX.65 As
discussed earlier, SOX protects public company employees who engage in a
broad range of activities, which not only include employees who report
violations externally, but also those who report internally to “a person with
supervisory authority over the employee” and “law enforcement.”66
Accordingly, the SEC broadly defined “whistleblower” under Dodd-Frank to
also protect those who only report violations to their employers or the police,
contrary to the narrow statutory definition of “whistleblower.”67
However, recently, the Supreme Court held in Digital Realty Trust, Inc. v.
Somers that the SEC’s rule should not be entitled to deference under Chevron
because Dodd-Frank’s text explicitly defined “whistleblower” to require
reporting to the SEC.68 This Comment argues that the SEC can nevertheless
promulgate a new rule that would exempt internal whistleblowers from this
requirement pursuant to the SEC’s general exemptive authority.
D. The SEC’s General Exemptive Authority
During the past few decades, Congress has recognized the “rapidly
changing” nature of the securities industry and found it necessary to expand
the scope of the SEC’s ability to exempt certain persons, securities, or
transactions from various statutory requirements.69 In 1996, Congress added
section 36 to the Exchange Act of 1934 (under which Dodd-Frank falls),
providing the SEC with the following sweeping general exemptive authority:70
[T]he Commission, by rule, regulation, or order, may conditionally or
unconditionally exempt any person . . . or any class or classes of
persons . . . from any provision or provisions of this chapter or of any
rule or regulation thereunder, to the extent that such exemption is
necessary or appropriate in the public interest, and is consistent with
the protection of investors.71

Congress expressly stated that this general exemptive authority is “broad” and
“w[as] designed to provide the Commission with the maximum flexibility to

65

Id.
See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
67
Final Comments, 76 Fed. Reg. at 34,304.
68
138 S. Ct. 767, 781–82 (2018).
69
S. REP. NO. 104-293, at 15 (1996) (“The Committee recognizes that the rapidly changing marketplace
dictates that effective regulation requires a certain amount of flexibility.”).
70
THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATIONS § 4.27, at 245 (7th ed. 2017) (“Until
1996, all [exemptions] had to fit within the guidelines established by [specific sections] of the 1933 Act.”).
71
15 U.S.C. § 78mm(a)(1) (2012) (emphasis added).
66

CHEN_COMMENT GALLEYPROOFS2

1056

5/15/2018 3:05 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 67:1043

reduce or otherwise alter” statutory requirements under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act).72 This power has accordingly been
described as “virtually unlimited,” with the only meaningful limitations being
that it is in the public interest and consistent with investor protection.73
Although Congress intended for this power to be far-reaching, the SEC has
used its general exemptive authority in the context of Dodd-Frank
whistleblower provisions very sparingly.74 In one notable instance, the SEC
exercised its general exemptive authority to waive the requirement that a report
of corporate fraud must be “voluntary” to qualify for a monetary award under
Dodd-Frank.75 A report is “voluntary” only if the whistleblower makes the
report before the SEC or another appropriate agency requests it.76 For example,
one whistleblower was initially approached by a self-regulatory organization
before reporting corporate fraud, making his report involuntary.77 However,
after persistently reporting the fraud internally with no response from the
company, the whistleblower provided the SEC with “specific, timely, and
credible information” that enabled the SEC to expedite its investigation of the
fraud.78 Recognizing the importance of this whistleblower’s efforts, the SEC
“found it in the public interest and consistent with the protection of investors to
invoke its general exemptive authority under Section 36(a) of the Exchange
Act and waive the ‘voluntary’ requirement” to make a $400,000 award to the
whistleblower.79 This exemption is significant because it demonstrates that the
SEC has been willing “to reach as far as the law allows to reward individuals
who assist in enforcing the nation’s securities laws,”80 setting the stage for the

72

See H.R. REP. NO. 108-19, at 2 (2003).
THOMAS LEE HAZEN, FEDERAL SECURITIES LAW 60 & n.249 (3d ed. 2011) (describing how broad the
SEC’s general exemptive authority is under the Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act) and noting that it is even
broader under section 36 of the 1934 Act). The 1934 Act also laid out specific provisions that were immune
from the SEC’s general exemptive authority, but none of these provisions correspond to the Dodd-Frank
whistleblower provisions, so they will not be considered limitations for purposes of this Comment. See 15
U.S.C. § 78mm(b)–(c) (2012).
74
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON SECURITIES REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES 153–54 (Jerry W.
Markham & Rigers Gjyshi eds., 2014) (“The SEC has not used this general exemptive authority with great
frequency.”).
75
See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 2014 ANNUAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON DODD-FRANK
WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM 11 (2014).
76
See 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-4(a)(2) (2013).
77
See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 75, at 11.
78
Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Announces Award for Whistleblower Who Reported
Fraud to SEC After Company Failed to Address Issue Internally (July 31, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/
News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1370542578457#.U9qeu_ldXxo.
79
See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 75, at 11.
80
DAVID J. MARSHALL, THE SEC WHISTLEBLOWER PRACTICE GUIDE 9–10 (2016).
73
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SEC to do the same to protect individual whistleblowers who likewise assist in
exposing corporate fraud.
Before engaging in an analysis of why the SEC would receive deference
for a rule promulgated pursuant to the SEC’s general exemptive authority in
the Dodd-Frank anti-retaliation protection context, it is important to discuss
what the exercise of this power would specifically look like. As discussed
earlier, the SEC may exercise this authority by “rule, regulation, or order.”81
Doing so by notice-and-comment rulemaking as the SEC did in promulgating
its invalidated rule would be appropriate because it would provide
whistleblowers with predictability on the consequences of internal
whistleblowing.82 Regarding the scope of the exemption, courts have allowed
for a very broad scope of exemption from a requirement (for example,
exempting all but one group from the requirement) as long as the requirement
still applies to some entity.83 In addition, the SEC may exempt “any
person . . . or classes of persons.”84 Accordingly, the SEC may promulgate a
rule that would exempt internal whistleblowers as a class from the Dodd-Frank
requirement of reporting “to the Commission” for anti-retaliation protection.
Here, “internal whistleblowers” would include those that have not reported to
the SEC, but have reported in a manner required or protected under SOX: to a
law enforcement agency, member of Congress, or to a supervisor.85 It would
not include other classes of whistleblowers, such as those who report to the
media.86 Essentially, this new rule would mirror the effect of the SEC’s
recently invalidated rule, but the SEC would have to state some additional
justifications to receive deference. The SEC should (1) state that it is
exercising its general exemptive authority, given that courts and interested

81

See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
See Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 567 U.S. 142, 158–59 (2012) (asserting that
predictability is the purpose of rulemaking).
83
See, e.g., Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 44 F. Supp. 3d 95, 118 (D.D.C.
2014) (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 653 (9th ed. 2009)) (defining exempt as “to free or release from a
duty or liability to which others are held” and holding that broad applicability of an exemption does not violate
that plain meaning).
84
See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
85
See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
86
Congress has consistently displayed a lack of encouragement of media whistleblowers, and it is
plausible in this context to reason that media whistleblowing would run contrary to Dodd-Frank’s purpose of
promoting financial stability because it does not allow companies to clarify misunderstandings before negative
information becomes public. See Elletta Sangrey Callahan & Terry Morehead Dworkin, Who Blows the
Whistle to the Media, and Why: Organizational Characteristics of Media Whistleblowers, 32 AM. BUS. L.J.
151, 151 (1994); Kevin Rubinstein, Note, Internal Whistleblowing and Sarbanes-Oxley Section 806:
Balancing the Interests of Employee and Employer, 52 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 637, 650 (2007).
82
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parties seemed to have forgotten that it exists,87 and (2) state how a rule
exempting internal whistleblowers from the requirement of reporting to the
SEC would be “necessary or appropriate in the public interest, and is consistent
with the protection of investors.”88
No court has explicitly analyzed whether it would be proper for the SEC to
use its general exemptive authority under Chevron, likely because the SEC has
used the power very sparingly.89 However, courts have analyzed when it is
proper to exercise the SEC’s narrower forms of exemptive authority90 as well
as similarly drafted exemptive authorities of other agencies,91 lending great
insight into how powerful the SEC’s general exemption authority is. This
Comment explores these court decisions in Part III, highlighting how agencies
can prevail under Chevron when they exercise their broad exemptive
authorities. In light of Congress’s intent to provide the SEC with flexibility to
uphold financial transparency,92 this Comment argues that the SEC would be
able to receive deference by exercising its general exemptive authority to
promulgate a new rule that exempts internal whistleblowers from reporting to
the SEC.

87
See infra Part II. Although in practice, the SEC is not required to frame its rule as an exemption in a
situation where the rule has the same effect as a rule formulated under its general exemptive authority, it would
be safer for the SEC to do so here where the exemptive authority has been overlooked. See Pharm. Research &
Mfrs. of Am. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 44 F. Supp. 3d 95, 119 (9th Cir. 2009) (stating that to require an agency
to frame its rule as an exemption in this sort of situation would “elevate form completely over substance”
(quoting Simmons v. ICC, 697 F.2d 326, 332–34 (D.C. Cir. 1982))).
88
15 U.S.C. § 78mm(a)(1) (2012). Section III.B discusses strong arguments that the SEC can make for
how exempting internal whistleblowers from reporting to the SEC is in the public interest.
89
See supra note 74.
90
See, e.g., Levy v. Sterling Holding Co., 475 F. Supp. 2d 463, 470–72 (D. Del. 2007) (finding the
SEC’s exercise of its exemptive authority appropriate because the authority-granting provision did not
“unambiguously foreclose the SEC’s interpretation”).
91
Pharm. Research, 44 F. Supp. 3d at 101 (holding the agency’s rule was proper when the granting
provision allowed it to “exempt, from the requirements of [the HSR Act], classes . . . which are not likely to
violate the antitrust laws” (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 18a(d)(2)(B) (2008))); Am. Ass’n of Retired Pers. v. Equal
Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, 489 F.3d 558, 563–64 (3d Cir. 2007) (finding in favor of the agency’s rule when
the exemptive authority-granting provision allowed the agency to “establish such reasonable exemptions to
and from any or all provisions of [the Act] as it may find necessary and proper in the public interest” (quoting
29 U.S.C. § 628 (2004))).
92
S. REP. NO. 104-293, at 15 (1996) (“The Committee recognizes that the rapidly changing marketplace
dictates that effective regulation requires a certain amount of flexibility.”).
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II. COURT DECISIONS APPLYING CHEVRON TO “WHISTLEBLOWER”
PROTECTION
The Fifth Circuit and Second Circuit as well as several district courts split
over whether to defer to the SEC’s rule based on the text of the anti-retaliation
provision. Primarily, this split derives from the different approaches used to
apply the two-step test laid out in Chevron.93 Under Chevron Step One, a court
reviewing an agency’s construction of a statute must first determine if
Congress has “directly spoken to the precise question at issue.”94 If Congress’s
intent is unambiguous, then that intent controls the court’s interpretation
regardless of the agency’s construction.95 However, if the statute is “silent or
ambiguous” on the specific issue, then under Chevron Step Two, the court
must defer to the agency’s construction if it is a “permissible construction of
the statute.”96 Although all courts that have decided on this issue primarily
analyze Dodd Frank’s text and structure in applying Chevron, they diverge
incredibly on whether to defer to the SEC.
A majority of courts follow the Berman approach and have deferred to the
SEC’s rule extending Dodd-Frank protection to internal whistleblowers. First,
under Chevron Step One, these courts found the statute ambiguous because of
the conflict between “whistleblower,” as narrowly defined by the definition
section, and the broad inclusion of both internal and external reporting under
subdivision (iii)97 of the anti-retaliation section.98 Second, under Chevron Step
Two, these courts found the SEC’s rule permissible because the SEC
reasonably interpreted the statute.99

93
Chevron, U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–44 (1984). The Separation of
Powers Restoration Act of 2017 was introduced to Congress in attempts to eliminate this Chevron framework
and is now awaiting Senate confirmation. See H.R. 76: Separation of Powers Restoration Act of 2017,
GOVTRACK, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/115/hr76 (last visited Feb. 28, 2018). However, available
data indicates that this bill is not likely to become law. See id. (predicting only an 11% chance of enactment).
94
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842.
95
Id. at 842–43.
96
Id. at 843–44.
97
See supra text accompanying notes 65–66 for how subdivision (iii) can include external and internal
reporting.
98
See, e.g., Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC, 801 F.3d 145, 155 (2d Cir. 2015); Wiggins v. ING U.S., Inc.,
No. 14-CV-01089, 2015 WL 8779559, at *1–2 (D. Conn. Dec. 15, 2015); Dressler v. Lime Energy, No. 14CV-07060, 2015 WL 4773326, at *8 (D.N.J. Aug. 13, 2015); Somers v. Dig. Realty Tr., Inc., 119 F. Supp. 3d
1088, 1104–05 (N.D. Cal. 2015), Lutzeier v. Citigroup Inc., No. 14-CV-183, 2015 WL 7306443, at *2 (E.D.
Mo. Nov. 19, 2005).
99
Berman, 801 F.3d at 155; Wiggins, 2015 WL 8770559 at *3; Dressler, 2015 WL 4773326 at *16;
Somers, 119 F. Supp. 3d at 1106; Lutzeier, 2015 WL 7306443 at *2.
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Conversely, a minority of courts declined to defer to the SEC’s rule under
Chevron Step One without reaching Chevron Step Two. Of these courts, some
follow the Asadi approach and found that the statute’s text clearly limited
protection to external whistleblowers.100 Others follow the approach laid out it
in Bussing v. COR Clearing, LLC and found that the statute’s text clearly
extended protection to internal whistleblowers, leaving no need to defer.101
Recently, the Supreme Court resolved the issue in favor of the Asadi
approach, holding that the statute clearly defined “whistleblower” as requiring
reporting to the SEC, and therefore, refused to defer to the SEC’s rule under
Chevron Step One.102
This Comment argues that despite the Supreme Court’s holding under
Chevron Step One that Dodd Frank’s text clearly requires external reporting,
the SEC can nevertheless receive deference by using its broad exemptive
authority to promulgate a new rule that would extend Dodd-Frank’s antiretaliation protection to internal whistleblowers.103 To demonstrate how the
case law on Dodd-Frank anti-retaliation protection has left room for the SEC to
exercise its exemptive authority, this Part discusses the Asadi approach, the
Berman approach, the Bussing approach, and the Supreme Court’s recent
resolution of this split in authority.
A. The Berman Approach: Dodd-Frank’s Text Is Ambiguous, So the SEC’s
Rule Is Entitled to Deference
The Second Circuit in Berman and a large majority of district courts held
that Dodd-Frank protection extended to internal whistleblowers under Chevron
because (1) the definition of “whistleblower” is sufficiently ambiguous under
100
See, e.g., Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620, 630 (5th Cir. 2013); Lamb v. Rockwell
Automation Inc., No. 15-CV-1415, 2016 WL 4273210, at *4 (E.D. Wis. Aug. 12, 2016); Puffenbarger v.
Engility Corp., 151 F. Supp. 3d 651, 664–65 (E.D. Va. 2015); Davies v. Broadcom Corp., 130 F. Supp. 3d
1343, 1350 (C.D. Cal. 2015).
101
See, e.g., Bussing v. COR Clearing, LLC, 20 F. Supp. 3d 719, 733 & n.13 (D. Neb. 2014); Ellington
v. Giacoumakis, 977 F. Supp. 2d 42, 45 (D. Mass. 2013).
102
Dig. Realty Tr., Inc. v. Somers, 138 S. Ct. 767, 781–82 (2018).
103
Although every court that decided this issue under Chevron focused primarily on whether
“whistleblower” is ambiguous for purposes of Dodd-Frank anti-retaliation protection under Chevron Step One,
that is not this Comment’s focus. Instead, this Comment provides a new lens on the issue by illustrating how
the SEC may receive deference for a new rule promulgated pursuant to its exemptive authority that would
protect internal whistleblowers, even if Dodd-Frank’s text clearly requires a whistleblower to report to the
SEC under Step One. Accordingly, this Comment provides just enough background to understand the different
ways that courts have analyzed the issue under Step One. For a more extensive discussion of this issue under
Step One, see Zizi Petkova, Comment, Interpreting the Anti-Retaliation Provision of the Dodd-Frank Act, 18
U. PA. J. BUS. L. 573, 580–92 (2016).
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the anti-retaliation provision, and (2) the SEC’s construction of
“whistleblower” to include internal whistleblowers was permissible and should
accordingly receive Chevron deference.104
In applying Chevron Step One, these courts find the definition of
“whistleblower” sufficiently ambiguous under the anti-retaliation provision
because a “significant tension” exists between the statutory definition of
“whistleblower” and subdivision (iii) of the anti-retaliation provision.105
Subdivision (iii) prohibits employers from retaliating against a
“whistleblower . . . in making disclosures that are required or protected under
[SOX],” which does not require disclosing to the SEC.106 Meanwhile, the
“whistleblower” is defined in the definition section as “any individual who
provides . . . information relating to a violation of the securities laws to the
[SEC].”107 While these courts agree that a clear definitional term typically
controls, it must yield when that definition would cause a provision to
contradict another provision.108 Since subdivision (iii) appears to allow a
broader scope of protections for individuals who do not make reports to the
SEC, courts find that subdivision (iii) would be rendered either superfluous or
extremely limited in scope by a strict application of the definition of
“whistleblower” under the definition section, and therefore, the strict definition
should not control under the anti-retaliation section.109
Courts have also found another area of tension between subdivision (iii)
and the definition section: certain categories of whistleblowers who are
required to engage in protected activity under subdivision (iii) would in reality
never get Dodd-Frank protection under the narrow interpretation of
“whistleblower.”110 Subdivision (iii) expressly protects whistleblowers for
104

See supra note 98.
Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy, LLC, 801 F.3d 145, 151 (2d Cir. 2015); see Dressler v. Lime Energy, No.
14-CV-07060, 2015 WL 4773326, at *12 (D.N.J. Aug. 13, 2015).
106
15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(a)(iii) (2012).
107
Id. § 78u-6(a)(6).
108
Berman, 801 F.3d at 154 (“Definitions are, after all, just one indication of meaning—a very strong
indication . . . but nonetheless one that can be contradicted by other indications.” (quoting ANTONIN SCALIA &
BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 227–28 (2012))); see also Dig.
Realty Tr., Inc. v. Somers, 119 F. Supp. 3d 1088, 1099 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (“‘[C]hemical weapon’ could not be
given its defined meaning because doing so would violate other principles of statutory interpretation—namely
[federalism].”).
109
See, e.g., Berman, 801 F.3d at 155; Somers, 119 F. Supp. 3d at 1101–02; Genberg v. Porter, 935 F.
Supp. 2d 1094, 1106 (D. Colo. 2013). For responses to counterarguments of this view, see Berman, 801 F.3d
at 151–52; Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620, 627–28 (5th Cir. 2013); Somers, 119 F. Supp.
3d at 1101–04.
110
See, e.g., Berman, 801 F.3d at 151; Dressler, 2015 WL 4773326, at *10; Somers, 119 F. Supp. 3d at
1101–02.
105
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making required or protected disclosures under section 78j-1 of the Exchange
Act,111 which requires an auditor of a company to first report corporate
wrongdoings to internal management, and then to the SEC only if the internal
management failed to take remedial measures.112 Furthermore, subdivision (iii)
also expressly protects whistleblowers for making required or protected
disclosures under section 307 of SOX113 and the SEC’s Standards of
Professional Conduct,114 both of which when read together require an attorney
to report securities violations to the company’s internal management and then
to the SEC only after internal reporting.115 Courts reason that if reporting to the
SEC were required for Dodd-Frank protection, auditors and attorneys would
get almost no Dodd-Frank protection because auditors must wait for a
company’s response to internal reporting before reporting to the SEC, and “any
retaliation would almost always precede [the SEC] reporting.”116 Therefore,
these courts find that subdivision (iii) and the definition section are in tension
and ambiguous.117
Once a court finds that the statute’s text is ambiguous, it must defer to the
agency’s construction under Chevron Step Two if it is permissible.118 All
courts to date that have found Dodd-Frank’s text ambiguous have also found
the SEC’s rule extending Dodd-Frank protection to internal whistleblowers
permissible119 and accordingly deferred to the SEC. This Comment will
therefore not analyze the issue under Step Two.

111
15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii) (2012) (“No employer may [retaliate against] . . . a
whistleblower . . . (iii) in making disclosures that are required or protected under . . . section 78j-1(m) of this
title[.]”).
112
See id; id. § 78j-1(b)(1)–(3).
113
Id. § 7245(1) (requiring an in-house attorney to report securities violations first to the CEO or
counsel, and then to the board of directors if the CEO or counsel does not take appropriate remedial measures).
114
17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b)(1) (2016) (requiring an in-house attorney to report securities violations to
internal management first so as to “not reveal client confidences or secrets or privileged or otherwise protected
information related to the attorney’s representation of an issuer”).
115
15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(a)(iii) (2012) (“No employer may [retaliate against] . . . a
whistleblower . . . (iii) in making disclosures that are required or protected under [SOX] . . . and any other law,
rule, or regulation subject to the jurisdiction of the [SEC].”).
116
Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC, 801 F.3d 145, 151 (2d Cir. 2015); see Dressler v. Lime Energy, No.
3:14-cv-07060, 2015 WL 4773326, at *10 (D.N.J. Aug. 13, 2015); Somers v. Dig. Realty Tr., Inc., 119 F.
Supp. 3d 1088, 1102 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
117
Berman, 801 F.3d at 151; see Dressler, 2015 WL 4773326, at *8; Somers, 119 F. Supp. 3d at 1102.
118
Chevron, U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 (1984).
119
See supra note 98.
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The Asadi and Bussing Approaches: The SEC Is Not Entitled to
Deference Under Chevron Step One

B.

In contrast, a minority of courts have declined to defer to the SEC under
Chevron Step One without reaching Step Two. Of these courts, some apply the
Asadi approach, finding that the statute’s text clearly limited protection to
external whistleblowers.120 Others apply the Bussing approach, finding that the
statute’s text clearly extended protection to internal whistleblowers and left no
need to defer.121

1. The Asadi Approach: Dodd-Frank’s Text Is Unambiguous That an
Individual Must Report to the SEC for Protection
In Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C.,122 the Fifth Circuit considered the
issue of whether an internal whistleblower qualifies for Dodd-Frank protection,
and held that the employee did not qualify after applying Chevron Step One
and finding the statute clear on the issue.123 The plaintiff claimed that his
employer violated the Dodd-Frank anti-retaliation provision by terminating
him after he made a report of a possible securities laws violation to his
supervisor but not to the SEC.124 After examining Dodd-Frank’s text, the court
held that Dodd-Frank did not extend protection to internal whistleblowers.125
In applying Chevron Step One, the court looked to the plain language and
structure of Dodd-Frank and found that Congress had directly spoken on the
issue, so the court rejected the SEC’s broad interpretation of “whistleblower”
for purposes of the anti-retaliation section.126 The court focused on how
“whistleblower,” under the Act’s definition section, “expressly and
unambiguously requires that an individual provide information to the SEC to
qualify as a ‘whistleblower,’” and how even the plaintiff himself admitted that
he was not a whistleblower as defined by the definition section because he did
not disclose to the SEC.127 The emphasis was on Congress’s choice to use the
120

See supra note 100.
See supra note 101.
122
720 F.3d 620 (5th Cir. 2013).
123
Id. at 622, 630. Notably, the Fifth Circuit was the first U.S. Court of Appeals to weigh in on this issue
and was later followed by a minority of district courts. See supra note 100.
124
Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620, 621 (5th Cir. 2013).
125
Id. at 630.
126
Id.
127
Id. at 623–24. The court also notes that the title of the anti-retaliation provision is “[P]rotection of
Whistleblowers,” which lends additional support that the anti-retaliation provision applies only to those who
qualify as whistleblowers under the definition section and plain meaning of the text. Id. at 626 n.8 (emphasis
added) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78u–6(h) (2012)).
121
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term “whistleblower” in the anti-retaliation section,128 instead of using broader
terms like “employee” or “individual,” which is significant evidence of
congressional intent to limit the scope of Dodd-Frank protection to external
whistleblowers.129 Accordingly, the court ended its analysis at the text.

2. The Bussing Approach: Dodd-Frank’s Text Is Unambiguous That an
Individual Does Not Need to Report to the SEC for Protection
Other courts have ended their analysis at Chevron Step One, but held
instead that a whistleblower does not need to report to the SEC for Dodd-Frank
protection because subdivision (iii) should be read as an exception to the
statutory definition of “whistleblower” for purposes of Dodd-Frank antiretaliation protection.130 For instance, the court in Ellington v. Giocaoumakis131
analyzed the text and structure of Dodd-Frank and held that the text was clear
in favor of protecting internal whistleblowers.132 The court reasoned that it is
“apparent from the wording and positioning of § 78u-6(h)(1)(B)(i) [the ‘Cause
of Action’ section133 of Dodd-Frank] that Congress intended that an employee
terminated for reporting [SOX] violations to a supervisor or an outside
compliance officer . . . ha[s] a private right of action under Dodd-Frank”
regardless of whether the employee reports to the SEC.134 Accordingly, the
court found that the text clearly supported a broad interpretation without
analyzing the SEC’s rule under Chevron Step Two.135
128

See 15 U.S.C. § 78u–6(h)(1)(A) (“No employer may discharge . . . a whistleblower . . . .” (emphasis

added)).
129
See Asadi, 720 F.3d at 626 (“If Congress had selected the terms ‘individual’ or
‘employee,’ . . . [extending protection to internal whistleblowers] would follow more naturally because the use
of such broader terms would indicate that Congress intended any individual or employee . . . to be protected
from retaliatory actions . . . .”); see also id. at 622 (“The preeminent canon of statutory interpretation requires
us to ‘presume that [the] legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what is says there.’”
(alteration in original) (quoting Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253–54 (1992))). For a discussion
of the Asadi court’s additional support for the text’s unambiguity and response to counterarguments, see id. at
622–29.
130
See, e.g., Bussing v. COR Clearing, LLC, 20 F. Supp. 3d 719, 733 n.13 (D. Neb. 2014) (“Some
courts have held that the tension between the statute’s definition of ‘whistleblower’ and the scope of conduct
protected by subdivision (iii) renders the statute ambiguous, such that deference to the SEC’s regulation is
appropriate under Chevron. . . . However, this Court’s reading of the statute, in context, offers a more direct
resolution of this tension.” (citations omitted)); Ellington v. Giacoumakis, 977 F. Supp. 2d 42, 45 (D. Mass.
2013).
131
977 F. Supp. 2d at 45.
132
Id. at 45.
133
15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(B)(i) (“An individual who alleges discharge or other discrimination in
violation of [the Dodd-Frank anti-retaliation section] may bring an action under this subsection in the
appropriate district court of the United States . . . .”).
134
Giacoumakis, 977 F. Supp. 2d at 45.
135
Id.
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More recently in Bussing v. COR Clearing, LLC,136 the court held that the
statute was clear, arguing that the term “whistleblowers” should be given its
ordinary meaning rather than its statutory meaning for purposes of the antiretaliation section, which would extend Dodd-Frank protection to internal
whistleblowers.137 Although the court recognized that a statutory definition
usually governs, it found that this was an “unusual” case that warranted
applying the ordinary meaning because applying the statutory definition would
render subdivision (iii) insignificant and thwart its purpose of shielding a broad
range of employee disclosures.138 As a result, the court applied the dictionary
definition, which defines a whistleblower as “a person who tells police,
reporters, etc., about something (such as a crime) that has been kept secret,” or
an “employee who reports employer wrongdoing to a governmental or lawenforcement agency.”139 Reading this definition into the anti-retaliation
section, the court held that the statute clearly protected internal
whistleblowers.140 Therefore, the court stopped at the text and found no need to
defer to the SEC.141
C. The U.S. Supreme Court’s Decision in Somers
On February 21, 2018, the U.S. Supreme Court in Somers resolved the split
in approaches by primarily relying on the same reasoning as the Fifth Circuit
did in Asadi: that the definition section of Dodd-Frank clearly defines a
“whistleblower” as requiring reporting to the SEC.142 The Court found that
when a statute’s definition of a term is clear, it is conclusive.143 Because the
statutory definition is conclusive, then under Chevron Step One, “Congress has
directly spoken to the precise question at issue.”144 Accordingly, the Supreme
Court found that it could not defer to the SEC’s rule, which interpreted DoddFrank’s text as permitting internal reporting for anti-retaliation purposes.145

136

20 F. Supp. 3d 719, 733 n.13 (D. Neb. 2014).
Id. at 730.
138
Id. at 729 (quoting Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 206–07 (2009)).
139
Id. (first quoting Whistleblower, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, http://www.
merriamwebster.com/dictionary/whistleblower (last visited May 9, 2014); then quoting Whistleblower,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1734 (9th ed. 2009)).
140
Id. at 729–30.
141
Id. at 733.
142
Dig. Realty Tr., Inc. v. Somers, 138 S. Ct. 767, 781–82 (2018).
143
Id.
144
Id. at 782.
145
Id.
137
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However, most notable about the Supreme Court’s opinion and that of the
Berman, Asadi, and Bussing approaches is that they did not foreclose the
possibility for the SEC to exempt internal whistleblowers from Dodd-Frank’s
clear requirement of reporting to the SEC.
IV. THE SEC SHOULD RECEIVE DEFERENCE IN LIGHT OF ITS GENERAL
EXEMPTIVE AUTHORITY EVEN IF THE DODD-FRANK ANTI-RETALIATION
PROVISION IS CLEAR
Going forward, the SEC would receive deference for promulgating a new
rule protecting internal whistleblowers under Dodd-Frank pursuant to the
SEC’s broad general exemptive authority under the statute, which allows it to
exempt any person or classes of persons from Dodd-Frank requirements.146
Courts typically apply the Chevron framework to determine whether to defer to
an agency’s exercise of its exemptive authority by notice-and-comment
rulemaking because Chevron applies to agency actions that carry the force of
law, as would be the case with notice-and-comment rulemaking pursuant to
any type of authority.147 The SEC’s new rule under its general exemptive
authority should receive Chevron deference even in light of the Supreme
Court’s holding that the statutory requirement of reporting “to the
Commission” for anti-retaliation purposes is clear. The new rule would be
entitled to deference because courts, in analyzing Chevron Step One when an
agency exercises its explicit grant of exemptive authority, look at whether
Congress has spoken on foreclosing the agency’s exercise of exemptive
authority on the statutory requirement at issue—in other words, whether
Congress left the exemption issue ambiguous.148 In doing so, courts focus on
the language of the exemptive authority-granting provision rather than on
whether the language of the substantive provision at issue is clear—in this
case, that of the Dodd-Frank anti-retaliation provision.149
146

See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 44 F. Supp. 3d 114, 118 (D.D.C.
2014) (applying Chevron in the context of an agency’s rule that was promulgated pursuant to the agency’s
exemptive authority); see supra note 63.
148
See, e.g., Levy v. Sterling Holding Co., 475 F. Supp. 2d 463, 470–72 (D. Del. 2007) (holding that the
SEC properly exercised its exemptive authority because the authority-granting provision did not
“unambiguously foreclose the SEC’s interpretation”).
149
See, e.g., Pharm. Research, 44 F. Supp. 3d at 116 (holding in favor of the SEC’s exercise of its
exemptive authority because the “plain language [of the authority-granting provision] is sufficiently broad”);
Am. Ass’n of Retired Pers. v. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, 489 F.3d 558, 565 (3d Cir. 2007) (“[W]e do
not find . . . that ambiguity must be present in the ADEA in order for the EEOC to exercise its authority under
[the relevant exemptive authority provision].”). This makes sense because in granting an agency broad
exemptive powers, Congress intended to provide the agency with the ability to “deal[] with the host of
147
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During this Chevron Step One analysis, courts look at (1) whether the grant
of exemptive authority is “sufficiently broad,”150 and (2) whether the agency
worked within the limitations of the exemptive authority provision (i.e., a
requirement that the rule is consistent with the public interest).151 Here, the
language of the SEC’s general exemptive authority is “very broad,” and the
SEC’s new rule, which would exempt internal whistleblowers from the
requirement of reporting to the Commission for anti-retaliation protection, is
consistent with the public interest.152 Therefore, congressional intent on
whether internal whistleblowers should be exempt is ambiguous, leaving room
for courts to defer to the SEC’s new rule.
This Part discusses how courts apply Chevron Step One to rules
promulgated pursuant to an agency’s express exemptive authority. Because no
court rejected the SEC’s invalidated rule under Step Two,153 whether the SEC
may receive deference for its new rule hinges on if deferring to the SEC’s
general exemptive authority is consistent with Step One. Therefore, this Part
will only analyze the SEC’s exemptive authority under Step One. Ultimately,
this Part argues that the SEC can receive deference from the Supreme Court by

unforeseeable problems which might arise in the administration of the Act.” Kornfeld v. Eaton, 217 F. Supp.
671, 679 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). Therefore, an agency should be able to exempt persons from the requirements of
the substantive provision, even if that provision is clear, as long as the agency’s exemptive authority is
sufficiently broad. See Am. Ass’n of Retired Pers., 489 F.3d at 565. The petitioner in American Ass’n of
Retired Persons v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission challenged this approach in a petition for writ
of certiorari, arguing that a court must find ambiguity in the substantive provision before it can defer to an
agency’s exercise of exemptive authority. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 12–14, AARP v. Equal Emp’t
Opportunity Comm’n, 552 U.S. 1279 (2008) (No. 07-662). However, the Supreme Court denied the petition,
which is promising news for agencies with broad exemptive authorities that are faced with a substantive
provision that could lead to widely impractical results when applied indiscriminately to all persons or classes,
as is the case here. See AARP v. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, 552 U.S. 1279, 1279 (2008) (mem.).
150
See Fin. Planning Ass’n v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 482 F.3d 481, 484–85, 492–93 (D.C. Cir. 2007)
(finding that the agency exceeded its exemptive authority when the granting provision narrowly construed its
authority to apply to “other persons” that Congress had not already carved out an exception for); Pharm.
Research, 44 F. Supp. 3d at 117 (holding in favor of the agency’s exercise of its exemptive authority because
the plain language of the authority-granting provision is “sufficiently broad”); Am. Ass’n of Retired Pers., 489
F.3d at 563–65 (holding that the agency satisfied Chevron Step One in exercising its exemptive authority when
the granting provision broadly permitted the SEC to “establish such reasonable exemptions to and from any or
all provisions of [the Act] as it may find necessary and proper in the public interest” (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 628
(2004))).
151
See infra notes 178–79 and accompanying text.
152
See Pharm. Research, 44 F. Supp. 3d at 118 (noting that the “consistent with the public interest”
language that is part of an agency’s exemptive authority-granting provision provides the agency “very broad
discretion” (quoting Nat’l Small Shipments Traffic Conference, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 618 F.2d 819,
827 (D.C. Cir. 1980))); infra notes 168–92 and accompanying text.
153
See supra note 119 and accompanying text.

CHEN_COMMENT GALLEYPROOFS2

1068

5/15/2018 3:05 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 67:1043

providing internal whistleblowers with Dodd-Frank anti-retaliation protection
under its broad general exemptive authority.
A. The SEC’s New Rule Would Satisfy Chevron Step One Because the
Language of the SEC’s General Exemptive Authority Is Sufficiently Broad
In determining if Congress has clearly foreclosed an agency’s exemptive
authority under Chevron Step One, courts look at whether the exemptive
authority provision is “sufficiently broad” to apply to the exemption at issue.154
The substantive provision (in this case, the Dodd-Frank anti-retaliation
provision) only matters as far as its text does not expressly foreclose the
agency’s exemptive authority (i.e., by mandating that the provision apply
uniformly).155
In Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America v. Federal
Trade Commission,156 the agency was expressly granted broad exemptive
authority, similarly drafted to the SEC’s general exemptive authority in this
case, which allowed the agency to “exempt, from the requirements of [the HSR
Act], classes of persons, acquisitions, transfers, or transactions which are not
likely to violate the antitrust laws[.]”157 The court looked at the plain language
of the granting provision and found that the agency could exempt any of the
above groups, provided that the agency was not exempting individual entities,
since the granting provision allowed the agency to exempt “classes.”158
Accordingly, the court held that the exemptive authority was “sufficiently
broad” to allow the agency to exempt all but one industry from a
requirement.159 The court also recognized that even if the substantive provision
contained a requirement with sweeping language,160 there was no indication
that Congress explicitly barred the agency’s exemptive authority,161 for
instance, by stating that the requirement must apply uniformly across all
classes.162
154

See supra note 150.
See infra notes 156–67 and accompanying text.
156
44 F. Supp. 3d 95 (D.D.C. 2014).
157
Id. at 101 (second alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 18(d)(2)(B) (2012)).
158
Id. at 116 (“While the FTC is not permitted to exempt a specific ‘person’ from the reporting
requirements, [the granting provisions] authorize the FTC to exempt general ‘classes’ of persons or
transactions.”).
159
Id. at 116, 136–37.
160
See id. at 115 (“[N]o person shall . . . .” (emphasis omitted)).
161
Id. at 118 (“[T]here [is no] indication in the statute that Congress intended to foreclose the FTC’s
effective grant of such broad exemptions.”).
162
See id. at 115–16 (indicating that the agency’s exemptive authority would have been foreclosed had
Congress expressly indicated its intent for the substantive provision to apply uniformly); see also Envtl. Def.
155
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In contrast, a court is more likely to find an agency’s exemptive authority
foreclosed when the language of the granting provision is narrower, for
instance, when the provision only allows the agency authority to exempt
persons that have not already been exempted by Congress.163 In Financial
Planning Ass’n v. Securities and Exchange Commission,164 a case that
concerned a narrower form of the SEC’s exemptive authority under a different
act, the granting provision only allowed the SEC to exempt from the definition
of investment broker “such other persons” not within the intent of the
paragraph where Congress had already listed five groups of exempt persons.165
Among these exempt persons was “any broker or dealer . . . [w]hose
performance of such services is solely incidental to the conduct of his business
as a broker or dealer.”166 The court found that the SEC exceeded its exemptive
authority when it provided additional exemptions to broker-dealers, reasoning
that Congress had spoken on the extent that broker-dealers should be exempt
when (1) Congress already carved out an exemption for broker-dealers, and (2)
the SEC only had exemptive authority to exempt “such other persons” not
within congressional intent.167
Here, the Court should find that promulgating a new rule that exempts
internal whistleblowers from the requirement of reporting “to the Commission”
for Dodd-Frank anti-retaliation protection satisfies Chevron Step One because
of how incredibly broad the language of its general exemptive authority is,
thereby generating ambiguity as to whether internal whistleblowers should be
exempt. From the plain language of the granting provision, the SEC is
permitted to, “by rule, regulation, or order, . . . conditionally or unconditionally
exempt any person . . . or any class or classes of persons . . . from any
provision or provisions of this chapter or of any rule or regulation.”168 As
further support, the 1934 Act also laid out only a few specific provisions that
Fund, Inc. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 82 F.3d 451, 466–67 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (holding that despite the substantive
provision’s sweeping language, nothing in the language precluded the agency from exempting certain
activities from the statute’s requirements).
163
See, e.g., Fin. Planning Ass’n v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 482 F.3d 481, 484–85, 492–93 (D.C. Cir.
2007); see also Nw. Envtl. Advocates v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 537 F.3d 1006, 1021–22 (9th Cir. 2008)
(holding that the agency clearly did not have the authority to exempt various categories when the language of
its exemptive authority-granting provision only allowed the agency to “issue a permit for the discharge of any
pollutant” and only in limited circumstances).
164
482 F.3d 481 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
165
Id. at 484–85.
166
Id. at 484.
167
Id. at 484–85, 492–93. This suggests that had the language of the granting provision been broader
(i.e., not limiting the agency to exempting “other” persons), the agency may have had authority to broaden the
exemption of broker-dealers, even when Congress had already carved out an exemption for broker-dealers. Id.
168
15 U.S.C. § 78mm(a)(1) (2012) (emphasis added).

CHEN_COMMENT GALLEYPROOFS2

1070

5/15/2018 3:05 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 67:1043

the SEC’s general exemptive authority would not apply to, none that
corresponds to Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower provisions.169 The “narrowness”
of these exceptions as explicitly laid out by Congress “suggests the broadness
of the SEC’s exemptive authority.”170 This general exemptive authority has
been viewed as “virtually unlimited”171 and should enable the SEC to exempt
internal whistleblowers from Dodd-Frank’s “to the Commission” requirement
for anti-retaliation protection. In fact, this authority is even broader than the
already broad exemptive authority of the agency in Pharmaceutical Research,
where the court deferred to the agency’s exemption of all but one industry
from certain requirements when the granting provision allowed the agency to
exempt “classes of persons” from the act at issue.172 And while the antiretaliation provision could be read as protecting only those who report “to the
Commission,” nothing in the statute indicates Congress’s express intent to bar
any relaxation of that standard, such as a provision stating that the standard
must apply uniformly to all classes.173 Therefore, the SEC’s new rule should
satisfy Chevron Step One under the SEC’s general exemptive authority.174
The SEC would also not have to worry about facing the same unsuccessful
fate as it did in Financial Planning Ass’n because (1) the language of the
SEC’s general exemptive authority is drafted much more broadly than its
narrower form of exemptive authority at issue in that case, and (2) Congress
has not yet spoken on the issue by carving out any particular exemptions for
internal whistleblowers. Here, the SEC’s general exemptive authority is not
limited to exempting “such other persons” not within the intent of Congress,
but rather reaches “any person . . . or any classes of persons.”175 In addition,
Congress has not yet created an exemption for internal whistleblowers under
Dodd-Frank,176 unlike in Financial Planning Ass’n, where Congress had
already carved out an exemption for broker-dealers under the Act at issue, and
the SEC in that case sought to expand that exemption. Accordingly, courts
169

See 15 U.S.C. § 78mm(b)–(c).
Steven J. Cleveland, Resurrecting Court Deference to the Securities and Exchange Commission:
Definition of “Security,” 62 CATH. U. L. REV. 273, 306 n.171 (2013).
171
See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
172
Compare 15 U.S.C. § 78mm(a)(1), with id. § 18(d)(2)(B).
173
See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat.
1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.); see also supra note 162.
174
The only meaningful limitation under the granting provision is that the SEC must do so “to the extent
that such exemption is necessary or appropriate in the public interest, and is consistent with the protection of
investors,” which will be discussed in section III.B below. 15 U.S.C. § 78mm(a)(1); see Pharm. Research &
Mfrs. of Am. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 44 F. Supp. 3d 95, 118 (D.D.C. 2014).
175
Compare 15 U.S.C. § 78mm(a)(1) (emphasis added), with id. § 80b–2(a)(11) (emphasis added).
176
See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat.
1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.).
170

CHEN_COMMENT GALLEYPROOFS2

2018]

SEC’S FORGOTTEN POWER OF EXEMPTION

5/15/2018 3:05 PM

1071

should find that the SEC’s general exemption here is not foreclosed by
Congress.
B. The SEC’s New Rule Would Satisfy Chevron Step One Under Its General
Exemptive Authority Because the Rule Is Consistent with Public Interest
While some may worry that not requiring ambiguity in the substantive
provision under Chevron Step One would allow agencies to circumvent
statutory provisions “under the guise of ‘exemption,’”177 an agency exercising
its exemptive authority is checked by the limitations established in the granting
provision.178 The SEC’s general exemptive authority, as it pertains to DoddFrank requirements, is limited only by the requirement that it is exercised “to
the extent that such exemption is necessary or appropriate in the public
interest, and is consistent with the protection of investors.”179 Although courts
recognize that the SEC has “very broad discretion” to determine how to best
protect the public interest and investors,180 they also recognize that even broad
“public interest” mandates must be bound by “the purposes that Congress had
in mind when it enacted [the] legislation.”181 This has been interpreted to mean
that an agency may not advance just any policy reason for its exemption, but
must advance a policy reason in an area that Congress contemplated as being
within the agency’s enforcement power.182
The SEC can argue that its exemption of internal whistleblowers from the
“to the Commission” requirement for Dodd-Frank anti-retaliation protection

177
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 11, AARP v. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, 552 U.S. 1279
(2008) (No. 07-662).
178
See, e.g., Pharm. Research, 44 F. Supp. 3d at 118 (looking primarily at the language of the granting
provision in determining the limitations of the agency’s exemptive authority).
179
15 U.S.C. § 78mm(a)(1); see, e.g., Lindeen v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 825 F.3d 646, 654–55 (D.C.
Cir. 2016) (holding a narrower form of the SEC’s exemption was appropriate because it was consistent with
public interest); Nat’l Small Shipments Traffic Conference, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 618 F.2d 819, 825,
827 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (holding that the defendant agency could “grant an exemption merely upon finding that it
is consistent with the public interest to do so” based on the “consistent with public interest” language of the
granting provision (internal quotations omitted)).
180
Lindeen, 825 F.3d at 650–54 (interpreting the “consistent with the public interest and the protection
of investors” language to mean that Congress explicitly granted the SEC discretion to determine how best to
protect the public and investors (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(3) (2012))); Pharm. Research, 44 F. Supp. 3d at
118 (noting that the “consistent with the public interest” language grants the agency “very broad discretion”
(quoting Nat’l Small Shipments Traffic Conference, Inc., 618 F.2d at 827)).
181
Bus. Roundtable v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 905 F.2d 406, 413 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (quoting NAACP v.
FPC, 425 U.S. 662, 670 (1976)).
182
Id. at 413 (holding that the SEC’s exemption was not consistent with public interest and the
protection of investors because it preempted “‘firmly established’ state jurisdiction” over the matter, which
was an “advance into an area not contemplated by Congress”).
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falls under the scope of its exemptive authority because it is in the best
interests of whistleblowers, investors, corporations, and the SEC itself. First,
this exemption benefits internal whistleblowers because they could take
advantage of a significantly longer statute of limitations, larger monetary
compensation, and direct access to federal courts under Dodd-Frank, rather
than remaining limited to the weaker protections of SOX, as discussed earlier
in section I.B.183 Furthermore, internal whistleblowers, who are required under
SOX to first report internally (i.e., auditors and in-house attorneys)184 and have
the greatest access to information about a company’s fraudulent activities, will
be protected under the SEC’s rule. These stronger protections will further deter
employers from retaliating against internal whistleblowers, incentivizing
whistleblowers with material evidence to report corporate fraud more
frequently.185 This in turn would better protect investors from the crippling
effects of corporate fraud, since internal whistleblowing is a crucial means of
exposing fraud.186
Corporations also benefit because exempting internal whistleblowers
would help eliminate the two-tiered structure that exists if Dodd-Frank
provided external whistleblowers with stronger protections.187 A two-tiered
structure has been consistently opposed by corporations because stronger
incentives for reporting externally could “unravel the years of effort that have
been put into maintaining healthy internal compliance systems” that SOX
mandated them to put in place.188 Finally, the exemption would also benefit the
SEC by preserving the SEC’s limited resources, because external reporting has
the potential to result in “an overflow of noisy signals—that is, a large number
of tips of varying quality—causing the Commission to incur costs to process
and validate the information.”189 Meanwhile, internal reporting can serve as a
filter because of its potential to allow good-faith corporations to remedy
complaints before they reach the SEC, enhancing the efficiency of the SEC’s
183

Recent Legislation, supra note 29, at 1834; see supra notes 44–57 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 110–16 and accompanying text.
185
Brief for the SEC as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellant, Safarian v. Am. DG Energy Inc., 622 Fed.
App’x 149 (3d Cir. 2015) (No. 14-2734), 2014 WL 7240193, at *28.
186
See, e.g., Lilanthi Ravishankar, Encouraging Internal Whistleblowing in Organizations, SANTA
CLARA UNIV. (Feb. 4, 2003), https://www.scu.edu/ethics/focus-areas/business-ethics/resources/encouraginginternal-whistleblowing (discussing the importance of internal whistleblowers at exposing securities
violations).
187
Recent Legislation, supra note 29, at 1834–35.
188
See id.; see also Rubinstein, supra note 86, at 650 (discussing the benefits of internal reporting over
external reporting, including the “prevent[ion of] negative publicity, investigations, and legal actions,” and the
potential to “allow the employer to clarify the misunderstanding before negative information becomes
public”).
189
Proposed Rules, 75 Fed. Reg. 70,488, 70,516 (Nov. 17, 2010) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249).
184
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enforcement power.190 Moreover, these policy reasons are bounded by “the
purposes that Congress had in mind when it enacted [the] legislation”191
because they relate to an area that Congress contemplated as being within the
SEC’s expertise under Dodd-Frank: the regulation of securities fraud.192
Of course, if the SEC wants an even higher chance of deference, it could
exercise its general exemptive authority in a less sweeping manner. It could
limit the exemption to a smaller class or subset of internal whistleblowers in
which the public interest is greatest at stake (for example, to attorneys and
auditors).193 Alternatively, it could exercise its power even more narrowly by
exempting individual whistleblowers on a case-by-case basis through
executive orders, similarly to the context of whistleblower awards.194 Even so,
the SEC should be able to promulgate a rule that broadly exempts internal
whistleblowers as a class, given how deferential courts have been towards
broad exemptive authorities195 and how “virtually unlimited” its general
exemptive authority is.196
Arguably, we should require the SEC to provide Dodd-Frank antiretaliation protection to at least some internal whistleblowers pursuant to its
exemptive authority because some courts have held that failing to do so on the
basis that the statute is clear could be considered “arbitrary and capricious.”197
If the SEC lets the current blanket requirement of reporting to the SEC stand,
not only would internal whistleblowers be deterred from reporting material
190
The SEC itself has stated that “whistleblowers increase [the SEC’s] efficiency and conserve [its]
scarce resources.” See Mary Jo White, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, The SEC as the
Whistleblower’s Advocate (Apr. 30, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/chair-white-remarks-at-garrettinstitute.html. Some express concern that emphasizing internal over external whistleblowers would lead to
greater securities violations because information that could have been used by the SEC will instead be either
ignored by higher management or used to “attempt a cover up.” See Dworkin, supra note 43, at 1760.
However, in large companies, “[s]ecurities violations often occur [because] of weak managerial oversight
rather than [cover-ups],” especially when more “active involvement” in higher management becomes
impractical as a company increases in complexity. See Petkova, supra note 103, at 594.
191
See supra note 181.
192
What We Do, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, https://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml.
(last visited Feb. 16, 2018) (detailing the purposes and responsibilities of the SEC).
193
See supra notes 110–16 and accompanying text; see also text accompanying supra note 184.
194
See 15 U.S.C. § 78mm(a)(1) (2012) (“[T]he Commission, by . . . order, may conditionally or
unconditionally exempt any person . . . or any class or classes of persons . . . from any provision or provisions
of this chapter . . . . (emphasis added)); supra notes 75–80 and accompanying text.
195
See supra Section III.A.
196
See supra note 73.
197
See e.g., Am. Petroleum Inst. v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 953 F. Supp. 2d 5, 10–11 (D.D.C. 2013)
(holding that the SEC was “arbitrary and capricious” when the SEC failed to exercise its exemptive authority
to relieve four specific countries of various public disclosure requirements under Dodd-Frank on the basis that
Dodd-Frank’s text clearly required public disclosure).
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information at risk of losing their jobs and reputations, but also investors,
companies, and the SEC would face heavy burdens at the expense of financial
stability.198 Therefore, the SEC should exempt internal whistleblowers from
external reporting, with the reassurance that such a rule should likely be
entitled to deference under Chevron.
CONCLUSION
Internal whistleblowers who risk their careers and reputations to come
forward and expose corporate wrongdoing should not be punished with limited
retaliation protections under Dodd-Frank. The enactment of Dodd-Frank, while
motivated by congressional intent to expand incentives and protections for
whistleblowers, introduced an important issue: do internal whistleblowers
qualify for the expanded anti-retaliation protections under Dodd-Frank?
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court recently held that Dodd-Frank’s text clearly
requires whistleblowers to report to the SEC to qualify as “whistleblowers” for
Dodd-Frank anti-retaliation protection.
However, the Supreme Court left open the separate issue of whether the
SEC could nevertheless exempt internal whistleblowers from this requirement.
Fortunately for internal whistleblowers, Congress granted the SEC with a
necessary and powerful exemptive authority so that the SEC can have wide
discretion to exempt any individuals or groups of individuals from any
statutory requirement under Dodd-Frank in the wake of a dynamic and
unpredictable financial market. This “virtually unlimited”199 authority is bound
only by the requirement that it is exercised in a manner consistent with public
interest. Given that expanded protections for internal whistleblowers would
benefit whistleblowers, companies, investors, and the SEC, a rule exempting
internal whistleblowers from the “to the Commission” requirement for DoddFrank protection should receive deference. This power is important to
recognize because it provides the SEC with a way to carry out the purposes of
Dodd-Frank and provide internal whistleblowers with the expanded protections
they deserve, even if the anti-retaliation provision clearly requires external
reporting. It allows the SEC to do so while still respecting congressional intent
because Congress had explicitly granted the SEC the power to exempt
whistleblowers from external reporting.

198
199

See supra notes 183–90 and accompanying text.
See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
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Even so, courts and the SEC seemed to have forgotten that this power
exists. Therefore, this Comment reminds agencies and courts going forward
how the forgotten power of general exemptive authority can play a
considerably significant role in allowing courts to defer to agencies that relax
clear statutory requirements, when a blanket application of those statutory
requirements would lead to widely impractical results.
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